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ABSTRACT 
This paper uses the notion of institutional logics to advance our understanding of institutional 
change in the ICT start-up eco-system in Japan.  We chose to study ICT start-ups because the 
rates of entry, growth, and exit are faster in this sector than in others, making it easier to 
observe institutional change.  Our study, based on data from interviews, closed master classes 
and document analysis, is presented in three steps.  First, we describe the two logics that 
coexist in the ICT start-up eco-system, namely Corporate Logic and Venture Logic, and 
practices under each logic in three arenas, namely the capital market, the labor market, and 
social networks.  Second, we identify several factors that enabled the emergence of Venture 
Logic during the period since the mid-1990s.  Third, looking into the future, we discuss the 
reasons why we predict that the two logics are likely to co-exist in this field, resulting in 
organizational heterogeneity. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Japanese economy and business have changed over the past several decades, and these  
changes are captured differently by economists, political scientists, and management scholars. 
Among the latter, organization theorists employing institutional theory potentially have a lot 
to contribute. This chapter aims to further our understanding of the evolution of the Japanese 
business system by applying the notion of institutional logics to the ICT start-up eco-system 
in Japan. The ICT start-up eco-system is an ideal setting to study incremental institutional 
change, as it is one of the fastest growing sectors in the Japanese economy with high rates of 
entry and exit, facilitating the observation of the emergence of new logics and practices. We 
aim to shed light on institutional change in the Japanese business system by studying how a 
new institutional logic emerged over a period of three decades, and by identifying the reasons 
why two logics, old and new, coexist in a field. 
There are a large number of studies that analyze the shifting landscape of Japanese 
management at the sectoral or national levels (e.g., Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005, Aoki, 
Jackson, & Miyajima, 2007, Yamamura & Streeck, 2003).  However, many fail to explain 
why an individual or firm-level change leads, or fails to lead, to field-level changes in 
practices. The underlying reasons can be studied only if we pay attention to the emergence 
and maintenance of institutional logics shared among the actors in the field. We therefore 
analyze firm- and individual-level practices to identify the mechanism under which new 
practices and logics gradually emerge in a field of the ICT start-up eco-system. We study the 
adoption of institutional logics and practices of business incubation in three arenas: capital 
markets, labor markets, and social networks. 
Through the analysis of qualitative data concerning the period between the mid-1990s and 
the 2010s, we identify two logics that coexist in the ICT start-up eco-system in Japan today, 
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namely Venture Logic and Corporate Logic. Our analysis also reveals eight enablers of the 
emergence of Venture Logic. We argue that Venture Logic spread from one arena to another, 
and continues to be adopted by a new generation of actors, especially those who are in the 
center of the eco-system. While Venture Logic is likely to diffuse further, strong pressure 
continues to exist for start-ups to shift from Venture Logic to Corporate Logic as they grow in 
size in terms of capitalization and workforce. Because Corporate Logic is at the heart of the 
established Japanese business system, actors in the start-up eco-system are subjected to a 
combination of Corporate Logic and Venture Logic. Consequently, heterogeneity in 
organizational practices persists because (a) the eco-system contains start-ups at varying 
stages of growth, (b) it is structured with a core and a periphery, and (c) the start-up eco-
system exists within the broader national institutional structure, and continues to be 
permeable in resource flows with respect to the large-firm sector in the economy. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The concept of “institutional logics” emerged in organization studies to further our 
understanding of institutions and institutional change. This section reviews the concept and 
evaluates in what ways it helps us to develop an agency-based theory of institutional change 
by linking the macro (field) and the micro (actor) levels of analysis. 
The concept of institutional logic 
An institutional logic is the set of assumptions, values and beliefs by which individuals and 
organizations provide meaning to their activity (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). An 
institutional field in which a logic applies is identified by the extent to which such 
assumptions, values and beliefs are shared by members in the field. Empirical contexts to 
which the concept of institutional logic has been applied are broad, spanning non-profit and 
profit sectors, ranging from publishing, retailing, banking, professional services (in 
architecture, accounting, law), venture capital, and HIV/AIDS advocacy (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006, Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004, Pahnke, Katila, & Eisenhardt, 2015, 
Thornton, Jones, & Kury, 2005). In these contexts, institutional logics are located in the 
institutional orders of family, religion, state, market, profession, and corporation (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991).   
An institutional logic is normally broken down into categories that become the subject of 
empirical investigation. These categories concern sources of legitimacy, authority, and 
identity, and the basis for norms, attention, and strategy (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 
2012). For example, in a corporate institutional order, the source of legitimacy is the market 
position of the firm; authority derives from top management; and identity is linked to 
bureaucratic roles.  Norms are based on membership as employee in the corporation; attention 
is ordered according to status in the corporate hierarchy; and strategy is based on corporate 
growth and survival. 
A key advantage of deploying the concept of institutional logic is that it enables 
researchers to link the mindset of the actor to his action or behavior. Prior to the development 
of the notion of institutional logics, neo-institutional theory had underplayed individual 
agency by emphasizing isomorphic pressures, be they normative, coercive, or mimetic, on 
actors within an organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The institutional logic 
perspective is an attempt to remedy the lack of an explanation of agency in neo-institutional 
theory whilst not overly endowing individuals with power. Thus, the institutional logics 
perspective provides a promising pathway to developing a viable theory of institutional 
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change if we can clarify in what ways agency and structure are loosely coupled, by linking 
multiple levels of analysis. 
Institutional change via institutional strategy 
Scholars from different traditions have characterized institutional change in a variety of 
ways. At one extreme, economists and social scientists in a positivist tradition view the 
evolution of institutions in terms of long periods of stability punctuated by relatively brief 
periods of change triggered by exogenous shocks or heroic action (Zietsma & Lawrence, 
2010). At the other extreme, political scientists and other social scientists in a more 
interpretivist tradition are mindful of what appears to be stability that constitutes a 
compromise among actors with conflicting interests. For theses scholars, institutions are 
socially constructed, subject to different interpretations as to their legitimacy. This leads to 
conceptualizing institutional change as more incremental, involving the gradual layering of 
new institutions onto pre-existing institutions, and the repurposing of existing institutions 
(Streeck & Thelen, 2005). 
This latter perspective points to a less deterministic view of how institutions influence 
actors who might be business firms, managers, or entrepreneurs. Moreover, this approach 
enables us to examine how actors influence institutions, while being embedded in field-level 
institutional logics. Such enquiry, however, must address what Seo and Creed called “the 
paradox of embedded agency” (Myeong-Gu & Creed, 2002). The paradox lies in the fact that 
agents of institutional change within a field are also deeply embedded in the institutions, 
undermining their capacity and incentive to bring about change. This paradox is therefore 
riddled with puzzling questions which are not yet fully answered (Battilana & D'aunno, 
2009). We discuss some of these questions below. 
 How and why would actors shaped by (i.e. embedded within) an institutional structure 
become able to promote change in those structures? One answer is exogenous shocks. The 
micro-equivalent of the macro-punctuated equilibrium with external shocks is jolts (Oliver, 
1992). Jolts may take the form of social upheaval, technological disruptions, or regulatory 
change. By contrast, endogenous sources of institutional change are trickier to analyse, and 
are explored via the notion of “institutional entrepreneurship” (Hardy & Maguire, 2008). 
These entrepreneurs are “organized actors who envision new institutions as a means of 
advancing interests they value highly” yet that are suppressed by extant logics (DiMaggio, 
1988). Institutional entrepreneurs attempt to dislodge existing practices, introduce new ones, 
and ensure that they are widely adopted and become taken-for-granted by other actors in the 
field. They create new organizations or effect a change within their organizations by 
switching categories from one institutional order to another based on prior knowledge. 
Institutional change is deemed to have taken place when field-level norms and conduct 
change as a result of a shift in dominant logic from one to another (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986).  
Thus, we know what institutional entrepreneurs do, but know less about from where they 
might hail. A resolution to this issue is partially addressed by analyzing their motivation and 
incentives to bring about institutional change from within the field. In particular, do 
institutional entrepreneurs arise from the least embedded periphery in the field, or can they 
also emerge from the dominant center of the field? Institutional entrepreneurs might come 
from the core of an institutional field because they have more power to influence, but they 
also have less incentive to change and would rather maintain the status quo. Or else, 
institutional entrepreneurs may come from the periphery of a field because they are less 
embedded, but they have less power to bring about change. Whether institutional 
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entrepreneurs are more likely to come from the periphery or the core of a field is often 
resolved by a case-by-case examination of strategies that actors pursue, and the field-level 
conditions that prevail.  In particular, once individual institutional entrepreneurs effect a 
change in their organizations, they are more likely to be able to diffuse the change to the rest 
of the field if the field is still emergent and not well established (MacGuire, Hardy, & 
Lawrence, 2004), or if it is in crisis (Hardy & Maguire, 2008). 
Ultimately, institutional entrepreneurs are found to have strategies to bring about 
institutional change, by giving regard to three things (Hardy & Maguire, 2008). First, they 
mobilize and recombine resources (including materials, symbols, and people) in novel ways.  
Second, they are able to articulate, sponsor, and defend new practices in such a way that they 
become legitimate or desirable. Third, they are able to forge new inter-actor relations so as to 
bring about collective action. These strategies ensure that institutional entrepreneurship does 
not stop at individual actions, sometimes heroic and exceptional. It also incorporates 
subsequent forms of “institutional work” undertaken to ensure subsequent diffusion and 
reproduction (Lawrence, Leca, & Zilber, 2013). In other words, organization theorists, by 
combining “old” and “new” institutionalism, have examined what Lawrence called 
“institutional strategy” (Lawrence, 1999), i.e. patterns of organizational action concerned 
with managing the institutional structure in which actors operate. Actors formulate and 
implement institutional strategies to create, transform, or dismantle institutions, by 
influencing the rules and standards that prevail within a field. 
To summarize, the institutional logics perspective provides a tool to study institutional 
change. It, enables the analysis, not only of how institutional change has led to changes in 
organizational practices, but also of strategic responses of actors to shape the interpretation of 
institutions. It enables researchers to focus their attention on the impact of institutional logics 
on action and practices, without being over-deterministic about institutions as constraints nor 
about agency driven by power.  When agents face alternative institutional logics, they can 
exploit ambiguity in institutions, subject to different interpretation and legitimization effort, 
so that their responses vary. In other words, agency leading to diverse responses is possible 
even in the presence of isomorphic pressures within a field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In 
particular, different reactions to the same external pressure can be analyzed in terms of 
specific actors’ endorsement or abandonment of an institutional logic, using symbols and 
rituals to legitimize such acts. 
We now apply this line of thinking to analyze and interpret data from the ICT start-up eco-
system in Japan. By doing so, we are also able to explore the under-studied points of 
intersection between institutional theory and entrepreneurship research (Phillips & Tracey, 
2007, Tolbert, David, & Sine, 2011). 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Research context 
We investigate how old and new logics and practices came to characterize the Japanese 
ICT start-up eco-system during the period spanning over three decades. The study identifies 
three phases of development: the first phase prior to1999; the second phase starting from the 
opening of new stock exchanges to the Livedoor incident in 2006; and the third phase 
initiated by the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008. Figure 1 presents the key statistics during 
each phase. 
<FIGURE 1 HERE> 
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The first phase started from the early 1980s when the criteria for over-the-counter-stock 
registration and listing on the second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange changed. The 
development of ICT industries engendered the first generation of ICT start-ups. Successful 
venture companies include, but not limited to, Softbank, Just System, Square, and Dial Q 
network. Further, the emergence of the Internet in the mid-1990s produced the next 
generation of start-ups such as Rakuten, Cyber Agent, IIJ, InterQ, On the Edge, Digital 
Garage, Kinotrope, Hikari tsushin, Cybozu, Netyear, Cybird, Netage, and others. 
The second phase was initiated in the late 1990s by the reform of venture financing laws 
(e.g. enabling limited liability partnerships for venture capital), and the creation of new stock 
exchanges, in particular MOTHERS at Tokyo Stock Exchange and Nasdaq Japan. Despite the 
bursting of the dot-com bubble in early 2000, these changes contributed to a gradual 
acceleration in the growth of the ICT start-up eco-system, as evidenced by growth in the 
number of IPOs and venture capital investment (see Figure 1) until the Livedoor shock
1
 in 
2006. During this phase, companies such as DeNA, GREE, and Kakaku.com found a space in 
the mobile business and expanded rapidly.  
Although the Livedoor incident and the 2008 financial crisis led to stagnant venture 
activities for a while, the third phase ushered in a new generation of start-ups, such as 
Mercari, Gunosy, Crowdworks, and others.  By the early 2010s, the ICT start-up eco-system 
benefited from a healthy pipeline of entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and angel financiers, 
leading to the emergence of a new logic of action shared among the actors in the eco-system. 
Research method and data 
To capture the practice-level changes in the field, we adapted a grounded, interpretive 
approach. We investigated highly contextualized processes of business incubation by start-up 
entrepreneurs and other actors who nurtured business incubation. We did not impose any 
particular framework beforehand, and collected data concerning the ways in which 
individuals conducted business incubation, in order to capture the field-level characteristics of 
the enactment of particular logic(s). 
We relied on different types of data from diverse sources.  
(a) Interviews are the main source of information. We conducted 29 semi-structured 
interviews in Tokyo during 2014-16, each lasting at least an hour, and all were 
audio recorded and transcribed. Interviewees included entrepreneurs and 
professionals such as lawyers, accountants, and venture capitalists.  
(b) Another data source is closed master classes, which were hosted by a conference 
organizer, each lasting around 75 minutes.  These sessions, 15 in total (3 of which 
were chaired by one of the authors) were held in a closed, off-the-record setting.  
Typically, two to three experienced entrepreneurs and other actors (38 informants in 
total) discussed specific topics related to business incubation such as financing, 
hiring, alliance, and their attitude toward business, in front of around 15-30 younger 
entrepreneurs. The sessions, video-recorded and transcribed, supplemented our 
understanding of the shared practices and logics among actors. 
(c) In addition, participation in 54 informal gatherings and start-up conferences and 23 
visits to incubation facilities and start-up companies helped us to understand the 
phenomenon, resulting in field observation memos. 
(d) Last but not least, we accessed media coverage, books and industry journal articles. 
                                                 
1 In 2006, the founder of Livedoor, Takafumi Horie, as well as associated stakeholders, were charged with violations of the securities 
and exchange law,  This incident damaged the reputation of TSE Mothers and contributed to a long-term slump in stock prices. 
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All the documents, including interview and master class transcripts, were organized in 
MAXQDA12 database for analysis. In total, 67 informants, recruited by purposive or 
snowball means, provided their insight on business incubation spanning different phases in 
the evolution of the ICT start-up eco-system (see the bottom of Figure 1). 
We followed the procedures and principles of grounded theory approach (Corbin & 
Strauss, 1990). The analysis adopted the process of abductive theorizing (Mantere & 
Ketokivi, 2013) in which we obtained inductive insights from empirical data, and then 
gradually developed a higher level of abstraction. We coded and categorized the empirical 
data in order to develop a theory, by following a process that Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton call 
“the methodology that enhance grounded theory development” (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 
2013). We used the practice lens of the institutional logic literature (Feldman & Orlikowski, 
2011), and developed new theoretical insights in an iterative process of theory generation 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 2006). 
As a result, we identified two different logics in the ICT start-up eco-system in Japan, 
which we labeled Corporate Logic and Venture Logic.  Note that these logics were identified 
inductively through the observation of the Japanese ICT start-up eco-system alone, not by 
contrasting the Japanese eco-system with other (e.g. Silicon Valley) eco-systems. Different 
logics revealed themselves when actors enact the logic in practice to reveal their thinking 
about strategy, power, and growth. Further, we sought, in our analysis, to identify the enablers 
of change that triggered the emergence of Venture Logic, and the factors that account for the 
persistent co-existence of the two logics in the field. 
FINDINGS 
The two logics: corporate and venture 
The two logics in a field 
Table 1 summarizes the contrast between the two logics. In the Japanese ICT start-up eco-
system, there are a variety of actors who follow different logics, with Venture Logic and 
Corporate Logic as two competing logics that co-exist in the field. In the past, Corporate 
Logic inherited from the traditional ways in which Japanese businesses managed their growth, 
dominated the start-up eco-system. More recently, a new generation of actors came to uphold 
a new logic, Venture Logic. We describe each logic, by contrasting the two logics as applied 
to three areas, namely how actors think about strategy, power, and growth. 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
Corporate Logic has been dominant in the large firm sector in Japan, and is also found in 
the Japanese ICT start-up eco-system. Financial-institutions backed venture capitalists, 
professionals from large companies, and entrepreneurs who are distant from the center of the 
eco-system, tend to lean toward Corporate Logic. By contrast, Venture Logic is a more recent 
emergent logic typically upheld by a new generation of entrepreneurs, independent venture 
capitalists, and angels with previous “exit” experience. In the 2010s, the ICT start-up eco-
system in Japan is structured with two separable communities, one upholding Venture Logic 
and another embedded in Corporate Logic, with neither community having an incentive to 
persuade the other to follow their pattern of conduct in the eco-system. Instead, the two logics 
coexist with little interaction between the two communities, as evidenced by relative absence 
of information sharing. Those who enact practices under Venture Logic regard the actors 
under Corporate Logic to be in a separate community, and vice versa. Neither group expects 
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the other to change the logic and the practice to join them. However, some actors occasionally 
shift from one logic to another logic, due to changing circumstances.  
The basis of strategy  
Under Corporate Logic, actors prioritize sustainability, and do not necessary drive for 
rapid growth as the basis of their strategy. Successful entrepreneurs under Corporate Logic 
generally demonstrate stable growth, even the most successful ones, due primary to their 
reliance on the entrepreneurs’ personal savings for seed funding and on cash flow and loans 
for growth. They tend to avoid excessive investment, pay attention to profitability, and 
control the pace of financing and hiring to minimize the risk of bankruptcy. They take extra 
care to retain existing business contacts, and are often hesitant to move beyond the area where 
they have confidence. One ex-entrepreneur stated: 
The CEO has the responsibility for the livelihood of employees, business 
partners, and customers. Growth is important, but that must be the result of good 
business. 
The actors under Venture Logic, in contrast, have a strong appetite for growth. 
Entrepreneurs obtain funding from venture capitalists to realize promising business ideas, 
constantly seek additional capital and labor, and sacrifice positive cash flow and stability for 
the sake of growth. Successful entrepreneurs often obtain funding without demonstrating their 
ability to generate cash surplus, by leveraging the funders who appreciate growth more than 
stability. They actively recruit talented executives and junior staff, with incentive packages 
that are linked to corporate growth. They proactively seek growth opportunities by extending 
the scope of business relationships. They dislike having underutilized resources, and 
minimize cash reserves by accelerating the pace of investment. One entrepreneur explains: 
 We call it, cash burn rate. That’s the word to indicate how many months the 
company can survive by spending the cash reserve. We are constantly battling 
with a negative cash flow, and risk continuity for the sake of growth. 
The basis of power 
The basis of power, underpinned by the actor’s legitimacy, recognition, and authority in 
the eco-system, also differs between the two logics. 
Actors operating with Corporate Logic appreciate seniority and stability, consistent with 
the value system of traditional Japanese management. The experience of managing stable 
operations without failure is valued. The quality of the service and product firms offer is 
important, regardless of size or growth of the firm. Entrepreneurs with a track record of 
contribution to society, maintenance of tradition, and avoidance of business risk are 
considered responsible and admirable. The corporate profile and history matters, and that 
alone can produce high status and power in the eco-system. The CEO of a firm that was 
founded in 1999 and has remained small notes: “Growth is the result. Not the objective”. 
By contrast, the key goal of the actors under Venture Logic is “exit”, i.e. to monetize their 
business by Initial Public Offering (IPO) or buy-out. The actors with a track record of 
participating, either as entrepreneur or supporting actor, in a series of exits obtain visible 
legitimacy, recognition, and authority. Entrepreneurs’ lack of track record or failure in the 
past does not matter if one could finally succeed. However, actors with Venture Logic are 
unforegiving of ventures that do not grow. A venture capitalist explains: 
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The entrepreneurs with a venture mindset dislike the companies that just 
survive for years without any indication of growth. Such companies are called 
“living dead”. They are alive but mentally dead. 
The system of growth 
Differences in the system of growth further reinforce the divergent mental models of the 
actors who follow different logics. As explained below, contrasts exist in the economics of 
valuation, the focus of attention, and sources of strength. 
Actors under Corporate Logic are recognized and rewarded by stability and continuity. 
They are rewarded if they generate sustained cash flow over a long period of time, even if 
they have no plans for “exit” via IPO or corporate acquisition. As failure means the loss of 
power, they focus more on cash flow stability and stakeholder relationships to minimize risk. 
Therefore, their strength comes from factors that stabilize their business operation, such as 
profitability, sufficient asset and robust organizational procedures. Good reputation and track 
record of strong financial management also matter. 
Such a system of growth contrasts with that for Venture Logic that values the enterprise 
value linked to market capitalization or the price of corporate acquisition. Naturally, the focus 
of attention goes to the speed of growth and potential that contributes to high valuation. 
Consequently, the source of strength evolves around the factors that accelerate growth. 
Notably, those with access to promising business trends, influential funders, and skilled 
professionals can differentiate themselves from others. The actors who leverage the system 
are: “the guys with ideas, the network, and the gravity to attract the talent”. 
Enablers of the emergence of Venture Logic 
Until the mid-1990s, Corporate Logic was dominant in the Japanese ICT start-up eco-
system; however, its evolution in the past three decades incubated an alternative logic, 
Venture Logic. Table 2 summarises the enactment of practices under Corporate Logic that 
was prominent among start-ups in the past, the enablers of change that have triggered the 
emergence of Venture Logic, and the enactment of practices under Venture Logic that has 
become prominent among some start-ups in the 2010s. All enablers had a gradual and 
accelerating impact. In this section, we analyse the field-level factors (i.e., enablers) that 
triggered the emergence of Venture Logic in three arenas: capital markets, labor markets, and 
social networks.  
<TABLE 2 HERE> 
Capital markets 
Wider range of funders help different stages of growth 
Until the late 1990s, venture capital finance received limited protection under the law, and 
banks were hesitant to provide loans to new businesses without tangible collateral. There were 
only a few venture capitalists, and their role was to give loans on behalf of the sponsoring 
financial institutions. Therefore, start-ups were largely self-financed, and they relied on cash 
flow for their growth, especially in the early growth stage. 
The regulatory change in 1997 enabled the establishment of limited liability investment 
partnerships. The opening of NASDAQ Japan and MOTHERS at Tokyo Stock Exchange also 
prompted various players to participate in venture investment. This new movement initially 
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did not produce many successful IPOs, due to the ending of the dot-com bubble and the 
underperforming stock market. However, the eco-system slowly engendered a new generation 
of funders. For instance, the venture capitalists who worked for bank-backed venture capital 
funds left their job to start their own independent venture capital. Successful entrepreneurs 
started to act as angel investors by utilizing the fortune they made from their IPO success. 
Concurrently, the first generation of IT start-ups gradually expanded their business, and 
formed their corporate venture capitals to diversity their business portfolio. 
As a result, the start-up eco-system gradually developed access to a variety of funding 
sources each with different characteristics. The funders tend to cooperate, rather than 
compete, for investment in order to help start-ups to grow, especially due to small fund size 
and different risk appetite. According to a venture capitalist: 
We know each other very well and exchange information. As each specializes in 
different stage and has different strengths and weaknesses, it’s better to 
collaborate than compete. When a start-up exits, they typically have financing 
from four to five different venture capitalists with different strengths.  
The first stage of financing is typically by incubators and accelerators who headhunt 
promising entrepreneurs. Such funders educate entrepreneurs about the attractiveness of 
starting a business and the necessary skills and knowledge. The entrepreneurs then may 
obtain seed funding from these funders or angel investors. Successful start-ups grow and then 
obtain “series-A” finance typically from independent venture capitalists that connect the start-
ups to the wider start-up eco-system. Then a selected few obtain typically the last stage of 
funding for most entrepreneurs before IPO, “series-B” funding from corporate venture 
capitals and/or financial-institution backed venture capitals that can connect the start-up to 
larger, traditional Japanese corporations. In later stages of financing, bank loan, bond, and 
other form of financing is also available from brokers. For relatively small, slow-growth 
companies, government backed subsidies also provide necessary funding. 
This layered financing system provides a wide range of support and sufficient size of 
funding to the start-ups when they require. 
Iconic funders emerged as catalysts for venture investment 
Until the late 1990s, there were a small number of well-known ICT entrepreneurs.  
However, they did not act as active funders of others’ business. Some iconic entrepreneurs 
appeared in the media, and they organized start-up events, some of which attracted hundreds 
of young aspiring entrepreneurs, to raise awareness of a “start-up movement”. However, such 
effort did not lead to funding of the next generation of entrepreneurs. The focus was on the 
growth of their own business, and without the capital market available to venture business, 
they could not monetize the high valuation of their own ventures to fund others’ business 
ideas. 
The situation gradually changed because of the accumulation of successful entrepreneurs, 
venture capitalists, and other growth supporting actors. Such people were considered  
legendry gurus of entrepreneurship, due to the proven track record of “exit”. Due to their 
experience and relationships, they have good access to skilled designers, engineers, managers, 
accountants, lawyers, and venture capitalists. They also can give legitimacy to the ones who 
they believe have growth potential. An entrepreneur notes: 
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Because of their gravitas, and their power to attract promising businesses and 
valuable resources, they can create the flow of resources necessary for the rapid 
growth of start-ups. 
The iconic investors and entrepreneurs with glittering success currently function as 
catalysts for investment and growth for the next generation of start-ups. This is because they 
can effectively facilitate financing and hiring by leveraging their name and provide access to 
the inter-personal/corporate networks. While only a handful of such people work full-time on 
business incubation, the iconic individuals function as accreditors, allowing the actors in the 
eco-system to identify the promising few start-ups. Start-ups leverage them as the catalyst of 
growth, acquiring necessary resources by utilizing the personnel’s prominent position in the 
network. 
Labor markets 
Rise of “serial employees” 
In the late-1990s, Shibuya, Tokyo, was the center of so-called “Bit-Valley movement”. At 
that time, young entrepreneurs and workers were attracted by the possibility of the Internet, 
and have gathered there and started a variety of Internet-related businesses. However, most 
entrepreneurs came from different industries or direct from educational institutions. 
As generations of start-ups grew and exited, the eco-system gradually cultivated a growth 
in not only serial entrepreneurs, but also serial employees. The latter are like serial 
entrepreneurs; they have expertise on accelerating start-up growth, and move to the next 
project once the company matures. Serial employees have experienced rapid growth, 
exit/IPO, and pit-holes a number of times. They can therefore contribute to the growth of the 
next generation of start-ups. The average tenure of the people in this eco-system gradually 
rose, and many are now serial employees. A headhunter specialized in the IT sector notes: 
They move because they know they have certain strengths and weaknesses. 
Some like to be in a very early stage of venture and to do fire fighting. Some 
others prefer to craft a system, rather than to spend time on maintenance. The 
move benefits both the start-ups and the people. 
Serial employees are the depository of knowledge and capabilities in technology or 
management. For example, the “zero-one managers” who can build a business from scratch 
are considered the most scarce resource. Further, “one-ten” managers and “ten-hundred” 
managers know how start-up companies should prepare for rapid growth. Serial employees 
often have experienced all the processes in successfully growing start-ups, and are able of 
transplanting their learning to newly formed start-ups.  
Earlier generation of start-ups provide talent for new start-ups 
Until the mid-1990s, the Internet start-up eco-system was still in the developmental stage. 
While the start-up companies expanded in the personal computer related businesses, they 
were rather isolated. Migration of engineers and managers from larger, traditional Japanese 
corporation to start-ups was rare. Start-ups in the early days faced the challenge of insufficient 
supply of skilled human resources. 
However, as the eco-system developed, successful start-ups (e.g., Rakuten, GREE, and 
DeNA) occasionally hired a large number of managers from established Japanese 
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corporations and professional service firms in law, accounting, and consulting. A human 
resource manager at a start-up recalls: 
 We had to quickly hire people to catch up with the pace of growth and market 
expectation. I have to admit we hired for a high-level position with high 
compensation without carefully checking the fit between us. Now most people 
have left and work in other start-up 
These people could not or did not wish to migrate back to traditional companies, and 
moved to other start-up companies to reuse their skills. Large start-ups also began to hire a 
substantial number of new graduates from prestigious universities. The graduates learned the 
way large start-ups function, and then many changed the course of their career to test their 
capabilities in smaller start-ups. Further, the start-ups that survived and became large are also 
a ground for legal, accounting, financing professionals to change their career from being 
external professionals to internal professionals. They develop specific skills required for a 
start-up companies to grow, and became the bridge between the external and the internal 
functions of start-ups, improving the quality of not only their internal operation, but also that 
of the eco-system overall. 
In this way, earlier generations of start-ups that grew supplied a large number of skilled 
workers to the eco-system. They function as the entry points for people who are interested in 
developing a career in the start-up eco-system. The large, established start-ups educate such 
people in their working culture and systems, and prepare them for work in the eco-system.  
Access to best practice via external professionals with a portfolio of start-up clients 
Up to the mid-1990s, start-up entrepreneurs relied on their own business knowledge. 
Especially in the early stage, it was difficult for tiny start-ups to pay the fees required to hire 
professionals. Therefore, entrepreneurs had to wait until they grow in size, obtaining 
legitimacy and sufficient fund to attract such talent. 
Over time, the growth in the number of start-ups operating in the eco-system attracted a 
handful of external professionals who specialize in giving advice to start-ups. Skilled 
professionals, such as lawyers, accountants, consultants, designers and engineers, are attracted 
by having a portfolio of start-up workplaces because the contracting arrangement minimizes 
the risk of depending on a single risky venture business. By having a portfolio of start-ups 
that they advise or work for, external professionals are able to maximize the possibility of 
advice leading to growth in future income from successful start-ups. An entrepreneur explains 
the benefit for start-ups: 
It’s hard for us to pay the expensive fees if we hire them full-time. We just want 
to learn the essence and we can improve later. If the person is really good, I 
always have an option to convince them to work almost full-time with us. Of 
course, if the person is not good, we can simply terminate the contract. This is 
much easier than to hire as a full-time employee. 
Consequently, managers with specific expertise may join a start-up on a project-based 
contract, teaching the knowhow to the internal staff, and improving the corporate systems to 
the level that match to the industry best practice. First-class designers and engineers often 
decide not to join any company as full-time staff, but contract with a portfolio of start-ups to 
work two or three days a week for each. In this way, start-ups can engage the best-in-class 
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talent without significant cost burden, and the professionals can also leverage their skills by 
being involved in multiple start-ups, some of which grow but some of which die. 
Social networks  
The increasing presence of growth supporting actors 
In the mid-1990s, start-ups had to help themselves or rely on available general services that 
did not embody sufficient expertise required for rapid growth. External professionals had 
limited incentive to serve start-ups because the fee income would be, on average, one tenth of 
that of larger companies. 
 As the eco-system gradually expanded in size, the inter-personal network has also 
expanded over the years. The network now accommodates professionals, such as accountants, 
lawyers, auditors, and engineers, who are attracted by the possibility of future income by 
accessing the eco-system. A few such professionals gained significantly when the start-ups 
they advised became large, and others started to follow the strategy to charge a low fee in the 
beginning thus deferring reward until after growth was achieved. While they typically do not 
obtain equity, they invest their time and expertise, and therefore are incentivized to 
materialize the growth of the start-up. They help the emerging start-ups to obtain access to the 
knowhow required to employ advanced techniques for financing, hiring and other critical 
business processes. A venture capitalist notes the role of such professional: 
Now the required standard of operation for legal, accounting, and other 
operating function is increasingly strict, especially for those start-ups that aim to 
IPO. The professionals help them to meet the standard. As some are very skilled, 
they are very busy working with promising start-ups. 
Well-known professionals are increasingly considered as an integral hub of the start-up 
eco-system. They facilitate the information exchange of important practices, introduce key 
stakeholders, and give the start-ups they advice a high-level of legitimacy as others tend to 
think that the start-up is valuable enough for the busy professional to spend his/her time. 
The formal communities as platforms for entry, expansion, and exchange of ideas 
In the mid-1990s, the first wave of formal community building has started. However, it has 
dissolved by the aftershock caused by the bursting of the dot-com bubble. For several ensuing 
years, start-up entrepreneurs did not have a place to gather. The eco-system had been a small 
closed circle, and one had to be an insider to understand what to do to access the circle. 
In the third phase since the 2008 financial crisis, formal communities such as conferences, 
gatherings, incubation camps, pitch contests, and other start-ups related events became 
increasingly important. The main organizers have been venture capitalists, government 
institutions, or news media. The actors have an incentive to organize or participate in such 
formal communities. For example, venture capitalists want to differentiate by organizing such 
communities to find promising start-ups and convince them to accept their investment. New 
actors participate to gain access to the informal networks. Existing participants participate to 
maintain their relation with other participants and find new contact. A conference organizer 
says: 
Conferences are the gateways of informal communities. People come to off-site 
conference, and in the night they go to drinking or dinner to maintain or expand 
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their network. They usually don’t directly compete as they offer a different service. 
But as all are in the same IT sector, they value having a tie with others. 
Social networks in the formal communities of the start-ups eco-system in the 2010s are 
rather flat and connected, despite the light and shade. In such formal communities, 
intermediary actors, especially venture capitalists, lawyers, and accountants are active in 
facilitating the networking of emerging firms. The formal communities work to source new 
participants to the informal communities of the eco-system, to give legitimacy to promising 
new participants, and to effectively create and strengthen the existing relationships. 
The informal communities as the channels of dense communication 
In the mid-1990s, the ICT start-up eco-system was “a tiny group of less than a hundred 
entrepreneurs”, according to an entrepreneur who started his first business in the mid-1980s. 
The informal connections at the time were therefore less complex than those that exist in the 
2010s. In the 1990s, selected few entrepreneurs were connecting their business and each other 
in traditional ways, such as over drinking parties and weekend excursions. 
As the eco-system developed in size, informal communities also grew in size. The growth 
of social networking services and messaging services accelerated the development of such 
informal information networks. The entrepreneurs just pick up their smart phone and launch 
Facebook, LINE, or similar services to ask business-critical questions to their comrades. Then 
within minutes, someone in the network can give the answer. If the answer is not appropriate 
or insufficient, others follow up to fix the bug. An entrepreneur showed how this system 
works: 
I have many chat windows for different groups on LINE and Facebook. For 
example, this chat group is for discussing the latest venture finance, asking 
someone who knows about the back of the envelope calculation of the valuation. 
This is to discuss about the articles of incorporation on which we can find the 
structure of preferred stocks. We share the secret, and so they are very 
informative.  
The informal networks facilitate casual exchanges of important, valuable information 
which is not public, such as the logic behind the valuation of a specific IPO, who invested in 
which start-ups, or which CFOs, COOs or venture capitalists are good or to be avoided for 
their incompetence. Such information networks reduce the complexity of financing or hiring 
transactions. These informal networks function as a tool to maintain the order of the eco-
system as the networks transmit information about the reputation of each organization or 
individual. If an organization of individual does something that is against the logic shared 
among the eco-system, such actor will lose connections to other participants of the eco-
system. The web of informal networks seems to drive and govern the growth of the eco-
system. 
Coexistence of two logics  
While prediction about the future is not easy, there are grounds for arguing that Venture 
Logic and Corporate Logic would coexist in the field for some time to come.  This is because 
Venture Logic is likely to be adopted by new start-ups, and likely to continue to diffuse by the 
presence of the enablers identified above. At the same time, Corporate Logic represents the 
logic of the broader Japanese national institutions that accommodates the start-up eco-system, 
and is therefore likely to continue to exist. In this section, we elaborate our argument below. 
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The gradual shift towards Venture Logic 
Our observation indicates that the shift in logic was due to a gradual change in the field 
facilitated by the “enablers” elaborated in the previous section. The actors adapted to Venture 
Logic because that benefit them. They could choose not to engage with the actors with a 
different logic, and actors were inclined toward either of the logics at any particular point in 
time. Therefore, the gradual shift did not lead to “novel institutional complexity” (Smets, 
Morris, & Greenwood, 2012) nor “contradictions” (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). In the 
Japanese ICT start-up eco-system, we found two ways by which Venture Logic diffused in 
the field. 
First, entrepreneurial start-up firms adopt a new logic step-by-step. A shift in an aspect of 
business incubation would trigger a shift in other aspects. This is slightly different from the 
“collision of local practice” explained by Smets, Morris, and Greenwood (2012). The 
transition is much more moderate; the installation of a new logic in an arena does not collide 
with the existing logic but replaces it, and then the new logic benefits from the installation of 
the new logic in other arenas. 
For example, hiring of a serial employee, for example an ex-CFO who experienced a large 
IPO, may result in large-scale financing and a high burn rate from an early stage. The large 
amount of financing and fast growth with a high burn rate would attract professionals with 
multiple workplaces and growth supporting actors, bringing further changes in practice. Start-
ups do not migrate from one logic to another at once. Rather, they adopt the new logic 
gradually for an arena and then adapt in other arenas. 
Second, the new generation of start-ups adopt the new logic as part of their institutional 
strategy (Lawrence, 1999). The start-up that was born at the centre of the eco-system, and is 
endowed with prominent funders, would be guided toward Venture Logic by active 
interaction with the actors who share the same logic. In fact, iconic funders, serial 
entrepreneurs, serial employees, professionals with multiple workplaces, and growth 
supporting actors collaborate and function as influential routes of transmitting and diffusing 
the logic and the associated practices. They have “legitimacy with respect to diverse 
stakeholders” (Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004) and have the powers to change the way 
start-ups conduct their business. Most of them are inter-connected to each other, and their 
“subject positions allow them to bridge diverse stakeholders and to access dispersed sets of 
resources” (Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004). 
Such actors who can command legitimacy under Venture Logic influence the ways firms 
and individuals incubate the business, often as a stakeholder or an internal member. As Geng, 
Yoshikawa, and Colpan (2016) found, the managers play a role in the diffusion of new 
practices; however, in our case, by migrating to the next generation of start-ups with the 
experience gained in the previous generation of start-ups. They discuss better ways fir a new 
generation of start-ups to accelerate growth, and transfer new practices to the ones with which 
they engage. 
As a result, the Japanese ICT start-up eco-system will continue to lean toward Venture 
Logic. Clearly, new start-ups are likely to adopt Venture Logic over Corporate Logic. 
Moreover, some existing start-ups may gradually adopt Venture Logic in some arenas.  
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The pressure to adopt Corporate Logic as start-ups grow 
Start-ups learn and endorse Corporate Logic in the process of growth by interacting with 
the actors under the logic. At the field level, we observed that actors might shift the logic 
according to their developmental stage. As Corporate Logic does not necessary facilitate 
business incubation, start-ups under Corporate Logic often face difficulty in financing, hiring, 
and social netowork participation. As a result, rapidly growing start-ups are typically under 
Venture Logic. However, as Venture Logic is not necessary compatible with the language of 
the traditional Japanese business system, when start-ups get closer to the wider economic 
system, the pressure arises for them to adjust their practices to meet the standards of 
Corporate Logic. This would be because they gradually change the actors with whom they 
interact as they grow in size. 
For example, the funders in the early stage, such as angels and accelerators, operate mostly 
under Venture Logic, while the funders in later stages, such as corporate venture capitalists 
and financial-institutions backed venture capitalists, tend to operate with Corporate Logic. 
IPO seems to be a turning point to move toward Corporate Logic because the market, brokers, 
lawyers, auditors, and accountants request start-ups to change the way they organize their 
business. This crucial event works as “theorization” (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002) 
of how publicly traded firms should operate, and in this case the stock exchange and stock 
brokers jointly theorize. In preparing for IPO, start-ups are required to be on schedule and on 
budget. The cash flow becomes sizable and positive, and start-ups gradually shift their 
financing practice. As start-ups grow in size and build legitimacy in the business society, mid-
career hire managers start to come from companies under Corporate Logic. Such managers 
influence the company to gradually lean toward Corporate Logic. The professionals who 
work for traditional, large companies also gradually pressure start-ups to move towards 
Corporate Logic. The successful entrepreneurs with Venture Logic learn to adopt Corporate 
Logic in the process of growth. They “revise the dominant logic as the nature of business 
changes significantly” (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). 
When start-ups grow, they gradually expand the network to wider society. As companies in 
other sectors tend to be older, more established, larger companies on average, they do not 
necessarily appreciate practices under Venture Logic. Therefore, to engage with the actors 
outside of the eco-system, start-ups will still have to learn to operate under Corporate Logic. 
Even if Venture Logic were to dominate the center of the start-up eco-system, the strong 
pressure on the expanding start-ups is unlikely to disappear, as long as Corporate Logic 
survives in the wider society. 
The eco-system center-periphery embedded in national institutional structure  
Entrepreneurs who have access to the core of the start-up eco-system tend to adopt Venture 
Logic.  By contrast,, those who do not operate with Corporate Logic. This structure in the 
field is equivalent to having a “center” and a “periphery” (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). 
We found that leveraging the dense inter-personal network at the core of the eco-system, 
start-ups at the center obtain finance from angels and seed investors and hire on the basis of 
personal introductions from iconic funders, accelerating the pace of growth. By contrast, start-
ups in the periphery of the eco-system rely more on financing from cash flow, bank loan, or 
government funding. They feel distant from the network of serial employees, professionals 
with multiple workplaces, and other growth supporting actors, and are dependent on direct 
business relationships or personal connections. However, the ways in which the actors under 
Corporate Logic incubate the business seem to be prominent outside of the ICT start-up eco-
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system in Japan. While they are on the periphery of the eco-system, they are in fact closer to 
the center of the broader economic institutions in Japan. 
Any subnational institutions are exposed to the broader institutional structure of a national 
economy, and are likely to inherit aspects of the national institutions. The ICT start-up eco-
system in Japan illustrates the case of such inheritance of Corporate Logic from the national 
business system, and the gradual emergence of Venture Logic, thanks to the increased 
presence and legitimacy of the actors under the logic. The distinctive ways in which these 
actors incubate the business have resulted in the separation between the center with Venture 
Logic and the periphery with Corporate Logic, with the latter firmly connected to the core of 
the national business system.  
If Corporate Logic were to continue to survive in the broader institutional structure of the 
national economy, the periphery of the start-up eco-system would continue to be subject to 
Corporate Logic. If this were to happen, isomorphic pressure from the two logics concurrently 
would influence the eco-system actors in the center and the periphery, leading to persistent 
“organizational heterogeneity” (Greenwood, Hinings, & Whetten, 2014) in the field. The co-
existence of two logics in the field also create opportunities for those who can navigate 
between the competing logics. Such actors accelerate initial growth with Venture Logic, and 
then continue to expand with Corporate Logic by drawing resources from the large-firm 
sector of the economy. Therefore, even if Venture Logic may come to dominate the eco-
system, we expect that Corporate Logic to continue to influence some of the actors in the eco-
system. 
CONCLUSION 
Drawing on a study of the development of the Japanese ICT start-up eco-system, we 
proposed a way to understand the process by which the ICT start-up eco-system in Japan has 
evolved over time. We investigated how the new logic, Venture Logic, has emerged in a field 
where Corporate Logic was dominant, and discussed the ways in which two different logics 
co-exist in a field. 
To our knowledge, our study is the first to apply the notion of institutional logics to 
interpret the causes and consequences of institutional change in the Japanese business system. 
While previous studies have already discussed the changing nature of Japanese institutional 
environment (e.g., Geng, Yoshikawa, & Colpan, 2016), they failed to explain endogenous 
sources of incremental institutional change, and the persistence of organizational diversity in 
the process of such change. Further, most studies investigate large traditional companies such 
as those listed on the first section of Tokyo Stock Exchange. In contrast, we studied the start-
up eco-system, and in doing so enhanced our understanding of Japanese management in 
evolution. We detailed the process by which Venture Logic gradually developed in the past 
three decades, and analyzed why some actors changed their practices, while others did not. 
We contribute to the institutional logics literature by analyzing how organizational 
heterogeneity within the eco-system retains. We argued that organizational heterogeneity 
remains because: 1) the eco-system contains start-ups at varying stages of growth with a 
different logic applying at different stages; 2) a variety of actors reside in the center and the 
periphery; and 3) one of the logics in the subnational eco-system is tightly linked to the 
dominant national-level institutional logic. The organizational heterogeneity, explained by the 
concurrent isomorphic pressures from the two competing logics, is likely to persist as long as 
Corporate Logic continues to earn legitimacy in the Japanese national business system. 
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The present research also has practical implications for actors involved in business 
incubation. The enablers explained in this study would help new entrants to understand the 
landscape of the eco-system. Successful actors may develop an “institutional strategy” to cope 
with exposure to two competing logics, while others may underperform due to the absence of 
institutional strategies in the face of institutional complexity. Best practice (underpinned by 
such institutional strategy) leading to successful new ventures depends not only on the eco-
system to which one belongs but also on one’s positioning in the eco-system. Successful start-
ups may employ Venture Logic or Corporate Logic to access  different communities of actors 
at different stages of growth. 
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FIGURE 1: key statistics for ICT start-up eco-system in Japan 
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Table: 1 Corporate Logic and Venture Logic in the Start-up Eco-system 
 
 
 
 
The Basis of Strategy
Objective Growth as a result Growth as an objective
Extra care on existing business relationship Proactively seek business opportunities
Control the pace of financing and hiring Constantly seek additional capital and labor
Priority Sacrifice growth for stability Sacrifice stability for growth
Avoid excess investment Rapid pace of capital investment
Positive cash-flow & sufficient cash reserve Negative cash-flow & high cash burn rate
The Basis of Power
Survival as success Survival as failure
Long-term business survival (not growth) Rapid growth (not long-term survival)
No experience of failure Experience of success or failure
Stable business operation Growth and "exit"
Stability of the business Growth of the business
"Exit" as departure from the community "Exit" as credit to the community
Actors with stability and tradition Actors with growth and/or "exit" experience
Prominence by consistent performance Prominence by the magnitude of commercial success
Hierarchy in community Hubs in community
The system of Growth
Business stability and continuity Enterprise value by market capitalization
Low uncertainty Growth potential
Accumulated assets IPO/acquisition price
Cash-flow stability and stakeholder relationship Growth speed and high valuation
Budget control Exponential growth
Existing business maintenance New business opportunities
The factors that stabilize business operation The factors contribute to growth and high valuation
Profitability Access to business ideas with potential for success
Asset and procedures Influential funders
Reputation and history Skilled professionals
The focus of 
attention
The source of 
strength
Corporate Logic Venture Logic
The source of 
legitimacy
The matter of 
recognition
The actors with 
authority
The economics of 
valuation
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Table 2: The practice from the past, enablers of change, and the practice emerged recently 
 
 
Limited external financing Wider range of funders help each stage of growth Finance from a portfolio of investors
Budget control to stay out of the red Iconic funders as catalysts for venture investment Obtain an attention of key person
Slow, cautious hiring of managers Rise of "serial employees" Active hire by referencing and introducing
Limited recruiting from smaller talent pool Earlier generation of start-ups provide talent Larger talent pool for start-ups
Learn from external sources Knowledge via professionals with multi-workplaces Learn directly from the experts
Knowhow via secondary sources The increased presence of growth supporting actors Knowledge directly from the experts
Relation within a small, closed circle The formal communities as platform Relation within larger, open commuity
Information from personal connection The informal communities as the knowledge pod Information from multiple online groups
Social 
networks
Learn from business contact, media, or 
government/private institutions
An access to the best practice knowledge and 
knohow from the early stage of firm growth
Learn from the experts directly with 
reference to actual business situation
Interact within a closed community, 
and hesitant to accept new members
A ground for new members to participate, and the 
existing members to maintain old and find new
Interact within larger community, and 
accept new members who qualify
Obtain information from trusted 
personal/business contact
A tool to faciliate effective exchange of 
confidential, valuable information among the 
Utilise multiple informal commuities  
by leveraging online tools 
Labor 
market
Rely on personal contact, hire 
managers cautiously to avoid the risk
Workers with experience of growth migrate to new 
start-ups to transplant the skills and knowhow
Actively hire managers  by checking 
the credential by references
Limited hire from large firms w/ some 
secondment from stakeholders
Large start-ups hire mid-career and new graduates, 
and such talent migrate to smaller start-ups
Recruit via wider range of recuriting 
tools from larger pool of talent
Learn from the experience by 
experimenting in the field
Professionals with best practice work part-time, 
offering the knowhow to broader audience
Learn from experienced persons by 
hiring professional for a limited term
Enactment of Corporate Logic Enablers of the emergence of Venture Logic Enactment of Venture Logic
Capital 
market
Finance from family, limited number of 
investors, main bank, and cash-flow
Funders with different risk appetite and strength 
collaboratively help different stage of growth
Finance from a variety of funders; cash-
flow positive only after the growth
Constantly remain in surplus to gain 
trust of suppliers, customers, and bank
Funders with authority endorse new promising start-
ups, and can accelerate the growth
Gain the attention of iconic funders 
e.g., by winning a biz contest
